The problem of the gap between strategy and tactics in the Israeli army

The gap between strategy and tactics in an army is the gap between the general procedures of the headquarters and the daily tactics used by the frontline forces; This vacuum can lead to confusion, inefficiency and ultimately the failure of a military force. The Zionist army is one of the most prominent military forces in the world due to suffering from a geostrategic nightmare, while also being weak in talent, which is always seeking to get rid of this problem. In order to achieve this goal, over many years, the chiefs of staff of the Israeli army have been adapting learning theories to the challenges facing the ranks of the Israeli army by designing a methodological process based on the analysis of postmodern philosophy, especially Foucault's perceptions; The same process that acts as the middle layer of strategy and tactics or compensates for the gap between the decisions of the headquarters commanders and the actions of the tactical fighters stationed at the edge of the battlefield. This research, based on the description and analysis of the content of the defense documents of the Zionist regime at the strategic level, seeks to clarify the theoretical realm between strategy, tactics and how to achieve goals in the Israeli army. According to the findings, the Israeli army acts to fill the gap between strategy and tactics in every battle, first of all against the enemy's systems and not only the hostile army. To defeat these systems, the Israeli army identifies their strengths and weaknesses and disrupts their balance. Based on this, every military action of Israel must necessarily affect not only the events of the battlefield, but also the society of the insider and the enemy; In fact, by paralyzing the enemy's points of gravity and focusing on the psychological effects caused by the competitor's inability to respond, Israel seeks to disrupt the balance and collapse of its enemies.